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Gauging Hospitals’
Financial Health
The annual increase in payments to hospitals for
providing inpatient services to Medicare beneficiaries
has been a major policy issue for the administration,
Congress, and acute-care hospitals since the implemen-
tation of the Medicare prospective payment system
(PPS) in 1984. Generally included in an omnibus
reconciliation bill, the increase is invariably linked to
Medicare savings. It is a vulnerable target for policy-
makers seeking to offset the cost of a new benefit or to
reduce overall cost inflation in the program. This year,
the annual increase is even more vulnerable, because
hospitals are perceived to be in particularly robust
financial health, as indicated by both their Medicare
inpatient and total operating margins. The Clinton
administration and Congress are pursuing Medicare
reforms—including enhancements of the program—and
view a cut in next year’s percentage increase (an
increase already mandated by the Balanced Budget Act
of 1997, or BBA) as a possible way to help finance the
reforms.
Operating margins—“profits,” in proprietary hospi-
tal terminology—are the traditional measures of hospi-
tals’ financial health. Reliance upon margins as princi-
pal measures of hospital profitability is raising ques-
tions in various quarters. The American Hospital
Association (AHA) and other hospital organizations
complain that Medicare inpatient margins—estimated
to be 15.9 percent in 1998—mask hospitals’ losses on
outpatient services and disguise certain hospitals’
financial struggles. Rather than reflecting a winning
hand for hospitals, the percentage obscures the fact that
some may be winners and some may be losers. A
National Advisory Panel convened by the AHA and
chaired by former Prospective Payment Assessment
Commission (ProPAC) Chairman Stuart Altman
indicates that margins are inadequate measures of
hospital financial well-being when considered alone
and should be supplemented by additional indicators.
Although the positions of the AHA and the National
Advisory Panel may be seen as self-serving, their point
of view is becoming more pervasive. Policy people who
work on hospital finance issues see operating mar-
gins—tied to inpatient services—as holdovers from an
era in which inpatient care under a fee-for-service
medical model prevailed. As health care has reconfig-
ured under PPS and moved relentlessly forward to
bundle outpatient and post-acute services under prospec-
tive rates, some contend that clinging to inpatient service
operating margins makes no sense. Integrated health
systems, for example, may have a number of hospitals,
some acute-care and some specialty, along with outpa-
tient clinics and surgery centers, home health agencies,
hospices, and other units, with various payment systems
and measures to indicate their financial health.
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
(MedPAC), the agency responsible for reviewing and
making recommendations to the secretary of health and
human services and Congress on Medicare payment
policy, has not gone that far. But, anticipating the
president’s call—in his fiscal year (FY) 2000 budget
proposal, released February 1—for the annual increase
to be frozen at its current level, it weighed in at the end
of 1998 with a more generous policy. MedPAC (an
amalgam of the disbanded ProPAC and Physician
Payment Review Commission, or PPRC) recommended
an increase of 0.7 percent, which is in line with the
increase mandated for the year by the BBA.
This Forum session will examine the controversy
over margins as measures of hospitals’ financial viabil-
ity. It will explore how the administration, Congress,
and the hospital field got to the current stage of debate
and what proposals are on the table for them to con-
sider. Looking to the future, it also will raise some
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questions on the policy implications of hospital finan-
cial measures and Medicare’s role in paying for inpa-
tient and outpatient services.
BACKGROUND
The annual increase in Medicare payments to
hospitals for inpatient services has a rather convoluted
history that is now entwined with the similarly intricate
saga of ways to measure hospitals’ financial status. The
Social Security Amendments of 1983, in establishing
PPS for Medicare inpatient services based on diagnosis-
related group (DRG) rates, prescribed that hospitals
receive an amount equivalent to the growth in the
“hospital market basket (an index of changes in the
prices of resources, such as equipment, supplies, and
labor, that are put into hospitals) plus two.” The “plus
two” percentage points, intended to reflect changes in
technological and other improvements, were quickly
cast aside, however, as the two houses of Congress and
the executive branch sought savings to reduce the
federal budget deficit or to fund other budget items. The
hospital market basket became the unit of measure for
negotiations each year among Congress, the White
House, and hospital officials.
Even when fixed in law, the annual adjustment has
tended to be a moving target for budgeteers. For exam-
ple, “the market basket is projected to increase by 3.0
percent in 1998 and by about 3.5 percent in each
subsequent year [through 2002],” the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) declared in a 1997 BBA report.
The BBA froze the basic PPS payment in FY 1998 and
reduced the update by 1.9 percentage points in FY
1999. It provides for the update to be market basket
minus “1.8 percentage points in 2000, and 1.1 percent-
age points in 2001 and 2002. . . . On balance, these
provisions will save $17.1 billion through 2002.”1
Since CBO issued its report, the market basket
projection for FY 2000 has been revised downward to
2.5 percent, which, minus the BBA-provided adjust-
ment, equals 0.7 percent. With the president having
recommended a freeze for FY 2000, the committees of
jurisdiction in Congress—the House Ways and Means
and Senate Finance Committees—will be the next to
decide. Their choices are to let the BBA increase of
0.7 percent automatically go forward, freeze the rates
as the president proposes, or set the update at some
other level.
The financial health of hospitals, as indicated by
hospitals’ average Medicare inpatient operating margin,
offers an appealing rationale for presidential and
congressional payment reduction proposals. That is why
the margin debate, which has waxed and waned since
the inception of PPS, has become so heated. Faced with
average PPS inpatient margins in the teens, the AHA
and other hospital groups are challenging the usefulness
of the measure. Some others in the health field are
questioning the nature and use of the hospital cost
reports from which the margins are calculated. They are
expressing skepticism about the traditional links be-
tween the delivery and financing of inpatient and other
levels of care. Not since former AHA President Carol
McCarthy argued in the mid-1980s with then Ways and
Means Committee Health Subcommittee Chairman Pete
Stark (D-Calif.) about the counting of hospital revenues
and expenditures has a hospital issue been joined on
definition; now, as then, there is much at stake.
MARGINS AND MORE MARGINS
The Numbers—What to Count
When MedPAC met in December 1998, it indicated
that hospitals’ Medicare PPS inpatient margin of 16.1
percent in FY 1997 was the highest in history. It esti-
mated that the margins for FY 1998 and FY 1999 would
be 15.9 percent and 15.7 percent, respectively, despite
BBA cuts. However, the commission said that nearly
one-fourth of all hospitals had negative PPS inpatient
margins in FY 1997, although that was much less than
the 61.2 percent whose margins were in the red in 1991,
the post-1984 peak.2
The commission also said that hospitals’ overall
total margin, which includes revenues from all payers,
was 6.4 percent in 1997, the second highest since 1984.
It compares with the following:
Percent Total Hospital Margin, 1984-19963
FY 1996 6.1 percent
FY 1995 5.7 percent
FY 1994 5.0 percent
FY 1993 4.5 percent
FY 1992 4.4 percent
FY 1991 4.4 percent
FY 1990 3.6 percent
FY 1989 3.6 percent
FY 1988 3.5 percent
FY 1987 3.6 percent
FY 1986 4.3 percent
FY 1985 6.6 percent
FY 1984 7.3 percent
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The AHA contends that cost control is the key to the
trend toward higher margins. In January of this year, the
AHA reported that hospital inpatient admissions
increased by 1.5 percent in 1997 over 1996, but the
length of stay decreased to 6.1 days from 6.2 days the
previous year. On the outpatient side, visits went up by
2.3 percent over the previous year. The data are based
on the AHA’s annual surveys of acute-care hospi-
tals—5,057 in 1997 and 5,134 in 1996.
Not only national but also state margin figures have
made their way into the daily and trade press. New
Jersey hospitals, for example, experienced a de-
cline—an average margin of 0.8 percent in 1997,
compared with 2.1 percent in 1996, according to an
audit done for the New Jersey Hospital Association.
The association attributes the decline to the amount of
charity care provided by hospitals in the state and the
impact of managed care contracts.4
On the other hand, New York hospitals, which had
operated under a state waiver to PPS, had their “record
surpluses for their first year operating under deregula-
tion” published by the state’s Department of Health,
which had conducted a study of the effects of deregula-
tion using the hospitals’ own audit figures. According
to the study, “New York’s 221 mostly not-for-profit
hospital corporations rang up combined 1997 surpluses,
or profits, of $739 million, a 42 percent increase from
the prior year.”5 The Healthcare Association of New
York State countered that the “figures are misleading
because they include unrealized gains on investments
and donations earmarked for capital projects.” The
association also contended that the data “fail to capture
more recent pressures, including a problem with late
payments and denials by managed-care plans, a rise in
the number of uninsured in the state, and a $3.9 billion
reduction in Medicare payments that New York hospi-
tals face” through 2002 as a result of the BBA. Saying
that income from operations more accurately reflects
hospitals’ 1997 performance, hospital spokespersons
pointed to a drop of nearly 28 percent (to $212.2
million) in operating profits. The state had used “unre-
stricted net assets,” rather than “net income or operating
income,” to come up with its surplus figures.6
The Numbers—What Types of Hospitals
The use of averages has also confounded the indus-
try, which indicates that certain hospitals—or certain
types of hospitals—are not doing well at all. Rural
hospitals, public hospitals, teaching hospitals, and
children’s hospitals have been singled out at various
times as needing special subsidies. The AHA contends,
for example, that “19 percent of hospitals have negative
total margins” and “9.9 percent have positive margins
below 2 percent. The AHA considers positive margins
under 2 percent as break-even and a sign of serious
financial trouble.”7
The Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) has been puzzled as well. The DHHS Secre-
tary’s Task Force on the Future of Academic Health
Centers (AHCs) last year explored the “financial para-
dox” of AHCs’ ability to stay solvent and fulfill their
health service delivery, medical education, and biomed-
ical research missions while incurring higher costs.
Reporting on the task force’s findings in a Health
Affairs article,8 Gerard Anderson, George Greenberg,
and Craig Lisk looked at MedPAC operating margin
and graduate medical education (GME) figures that
suggest “that the Medicare program may be overpaying
AHC [hospitals], at least as measured by PPS operating
margins.” They also looked at Medicaid GME support
and noted that it was declining as a result of states’
placing their programs under managed care.
Acknowledging that, according to MedPAC data for
FY 1995, AHC hospitals had an average PPS inpatient
margin of 21.4 percent, as compared to 10.5 percent for
all hospitals, Anderson and Greenberg looked at
categories within AHCs (in this case, total margins
rather than PPS margins only).
Public AHCs had the lowest total margins in 1995,
3.2 percent. In 1995, AHCs located in markets with
high managed care penetration had lower total mar-
gins than the overall average for all AHCs, 3.6 percent
compared with 4.5 percent. However, other studies
examining the relationship between margins and
managed care penetration reach contrary conclusions.
The two researchers also looked at hospitals with
operating losses. Again, they found that “public AHCs
were more likely to have negative total margins than
private AHCs” and that “AHCs in markets with high
managed care penetration were more likely to have
negative total margins.” But they concluded that no one
class of hospitals dominated the group with negative
margins. In addition, recognizing that “operating
margins are only one measure of financial viability,”
they examined other indicators. On most of them, the
AHCs’ financial position improved to be generally
comparable to the overall hospital average. The indica-
tors were cash on hand, return on equity, long-term debt
to equity, asset turnover ratio, and net assets per bed.
Only on net assets per bed were AHC hospitals signifi-
cantly different from other hospitals: $252,000 in AHC
hospitals compared to $56,000 in nonteaching hospitals.
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DHHS has also examined children’s hospitals, with
the result that the president included a legislative
proposal for $40 million in funds for children’s teach-
ing hospitals in his FY 2000 budget. Part of the ratio-
nale for providing the funds is that “many children’s
hospitals have negative operating margins, in part
because they have unusually high proportions of
Medicaid patients, and the lack of equitable support for
GME compared with other teaching hospitals.” The
department is examining mechanisms for payment, such
as a formula grant approach. In its budget documents,
the White House indicated that payment would be
“related to individual performance relative to the
accomplishments of [the] hospitals as a group.” The
administration is considering various measures to gauge
the effects of payments the hospitals receive. Possible
indicators include their “financial status,” in terms of
operating margins; “percentage of residents’ training
that is supported in ambulatory settings; percentage of
patients served living in poverty; percentage of unin-
sured patients”; and “shortages (if any) of pediatric
health care providers in the area of the facility.”9
In a 1998 survey of 5,190 acute hospitals across the
country, the accounting firm of Deloitte & Touche
LLP found that average profit margins—defined by
the reporting hospitals, 12 percent of those sur-
veyed—were averaging 6.5 percent. “Hospitals are
projecting overall profit margins to decline to 5.5
percent over the next two years, and to 5.2 percent in
five years.” Of types of hospitals,
inner-city hospitals report the lowest average profit
margins of 4.6 percent, while the highest margins are
in the suburban hospital category at 7.6 percent,
followed by rural hospitals at 6.4 percent and other
urban hospitals at 5.8 percent. Investor-owned hospi-
tals report the highest profits—an average of 11.1
percent—with government hospitals reporting an
average of only 5.8 percent.
The Deloitte & Touche survey also indicated that
“average profitability varies by region, with New
England and Mid-Atlantic hospitals reporting the lowest
average profits at 4.2 percent, while the West South
Central region reports average profits of 8.2 percent.”10
SOME OTHER APPROACHES
As PPS has expanded its inpatient focus to outpa-
tient and sub-acute services and as hospital systems
have brought together a broad continuum of services,
from primary through long-term care, individuals and
groups within the health arena have turned their atten-
tion to the best ways of measuring the economic and
quality results. The recommendations tend to go way
beyond margins.
National Advisory Panel
The National Advisory Panel, which convened
health services researchers, accountants and other
health finance experts, hospital chief executive officers,
and trade association representatives in April 1998 to
look at financial viability measures, concluded that
“three categories of financial measures” are “critical to
consider.” The panel’s report included (a) “net income
(revenue minus expense),” because “persistent failure
to earn a positive ‘bottom line’ can both signal and fuel
a downward spiral for an organization”; (b) “liquidity
and cash flow,” because, “even with good margins,
providers need enough liquid assets (increasingly cash)
to meet near term obligations (to employees, vendors,
and creditors) and to move on community needs and
opportunities”; and (c) “debt burden,” because if they
are “too high, debt levels limit flexibility and pose
undue risks of default or insolvency, if demand shifts or
prices slump.”11
Panel members expressed concern about Medicare
cost reports, particularly in terms of the reconfiguration of
health care delivery, especially the growth of outpatient
relative to inpatient services. Saying that “the Medicare
cost report framework merits ongoing updating, valida-
tion, and refinement,” they contended that the best
sources of financial data are “certified financial state-
ments, prepared annually for hospitals and health systems
after an audit by CPA firms.” They also felt that bond
ratings can be valuable, particularly because independent
analysts—counting financial and nonfinancial fac-
tors—produce and update them. They acknowledged that
such ratings are limited because “not all providers have
ratings and . . . the degree of ‘risk aversion or preference’
implicit in ratings is not easily quantified.”
The panel also identified some nonfinancial factors
for assessing providers. They include the
quality of strategy and management; market condi-
tions (including managed care); strength of relation-
ships with physicians, staff, communities, and part-
ners; and investment in relationships, clinical and
information technology, knowledge, and ongoing
improvement.
MedPAC
Although the annual updates to the operating
payment rate under the Medicare hospital inpatient PPS
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already are set in law, MedPAC each year provides
guidance to the Congress on the appropriate update for
the upcoming fiscal year. MedPAC’s recommendations
are based on its ongoing analyses of the factors that
determine year-to-year changes in hospital costs,
including hospital input price inflation, changes in the
care provided by hospitals and the way that care is
provided, and the complexity of the patients they treat.
Although MedPAC’s recommendation for 2000 was to
stick with the update enacted in the BBA, the commis-
sion’s analysis indicated that an update anywhere
between zero and 2.6 percent could be justified.
MedPAC’s recommendation was made
in the context of evidence that the hospital industry
has thus far successfully adapted to a more competi-
tive market by changing its practice patterns and
reducing its costs, but also out of concern that many
of the major effects of the BBA are not yet fully
evident. Therefore, reducing payment rates below the
level prescribed in the BBA would not be prudent, at
least for this year.12
Center for Healthcare Industry
Performance Studies
The Center for Healthcare Industry Performance
Studies (CHIPS), located in Columbus, Ohio, has
extensive data files on U.S. hospitals. The files include
audited financial statements from approximately 3,400
voluntary not-for-profit hospitals, operating perfor-
mance data from about 1,800 of that group, and Medi-
care cost reports from approximately 6,000 for- and not-
for-profit hospitals. From this database CHIPS draws
“constant sample size” data, defined as data “that the
same hospitals have reported . . . for each time period
under study.” It uses the data to generate 35 financial
indicators and 43 operating indicators. The financial
indicators can be grouped into five categories, ex-
pressed as ratios: profitability (including total margin),
liquidity, capital structure, asset efficiency, and “other
financial.” The operating indicators, which sometimes
are divided between inpatient and outpatient services,
are in seven categories: profitability, price, volume,
length of stay, intensity of service, efficiency, and unit
cost of inputs.13
The median hospital total margin was 5.4 percent in
FY 1997, compared to 4.4 percent in FY 1996, accord-
ing to CHIPS data. CHIPS’ financial flexibility index,
which measures financial survivability on both a short-
and an intermediate-term basis, showed improvement in
FY 1997 over FY 1996. Medians for “high perfor-
mance” and “low performance” showed an increasing
gap between hospitals with strong financial perfor-
mance and those with weak financial performance.
Small urban hospitals showed particular weakness. In
an interview with Modern Healthcare, CHIPS President
William O. Cleverley cited 1998-1999 almanac figures
indicating that, after small increases, hospital costs per
discharge rose 2.1 percent in FY 1997. “If cost control
efforts have indeed peaked, future hospital profits could
fall dramatically if pricing pressures resulting from the
BBA materialize.”
Clearly, there are many ways to measure hospitals’
financial health, some of which focus only on acute-
care hospitals and others of which take outpatient and
other services into account. This year, because of
controversy over the PPS update, the measures are
attracting attention not only from the usual policy
analysts who are used to comparing Indicator A and
Indicator B but also from the policy community at large.
Moreover, as the community focuses on managed care
options, especially the federal government’s new multi-
choice Medicare+Choice initiative, it is gaining a
greater appreciation of the links between delivery and
financing. For example, with some plans having
dropped out of or reduced their service areas in
Medicare+Choice because of its payment levels (de-
tailed in NHPF Issue Brief No. 730, Medicare HMO
Pullouts: What Do They Portend for the Future of
Medicare+Choice?), discussions of plans’ financial
health and the effects of payment rates on them are
extending to that program as well. So what began as a
lobbying effort on the part of hospitals seems to be
having ripple effects.
SOME KEY QUESTIONS
Using margins as measures to gauge hospitals’
financial health raises a number of questions. The
following will guide the Forum session:
 Why were operating and total margins—whether for
Medicare or for other programs—chosen as mea-
sures in the first place?
 What impact has case mix had on Medicare PPS and
total margins since PPS was implemented?
 Is the current debate over operating and total
margins—in its linkage to the Medicare PPS hospi-
tal update—a smoke screen for hospitals’ lobbying
on the PPS update? 
 Has the health care sector evolved to the point that
hospital inpatient service indicators are useful only
for measuring acute-care and for nothing else?
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 What is the status of outpatient service indicators?
 As services are bundled and coordinated under PPS,
what sorts of measures should be used to assess
hospitals’ financial performance? Medicare benefi-
ciaries’ access to services? 
 What effects is the BBA expected to have on hospi-
tals’ financial health? How can researchers tell?
 Should the financial status of certain types of
hospitals—say, teaching hospitals or children’s
hospitals—be assessed separately? Differently?
 What would be better indicators than operating and
total margins? The National Advisory Panel’s
recommendations? Those of the Center for Health-
care Industry Performance Studies?
 How would the selection of new measures affect
MedPAC’s role?
 How should margins and other financial perfor-
mance indicators be used by policymakers?
 From a health systems point of view, what is the
significance of the margins debate?
THE FORUM SESSION
This Forum meeting will examine indicators of hospi-
tals’ financial status, focus on the major issues the indica-
tors raise, and highlight recommendations of different
ways of assessing hospitals’ financial health. It also will
explore the implications of the update for FY 2000, in
terms of the BBA provision, president’s proposal, and
MedPAC and other organizations’ perspectives.
Four panelists will examine the topic. Following
their brief comments, there will be a roundtable discus-
sion with meeting participants.
Lawrence S. Goldberg, director of national affairs
for health care in Deloitte & Touche’s Washington
office, will provide an overview of hospital financial
indicators and the ways in which they have been used in
the policy environment, leading to the current PPS
update debate. Prior to joining Deloitte in the mid-
1980s, he spent 11 years with the AHA, working on
Medicare prospective payment legislation and imple-
mentation and chairing the UB-82 national claim form
committee, among other activities.
William O. Cleverley, Ph.D., C.P.A., is co-founder
and president of the Center for Healthcare Industry
Performance Studies and a faculty member in Ohio State
University’s Graduate Program in Hospital and Health
Services Administration and its Department of Account-
ing. He has been a health care educator, consultant,
researcher, and author for 25 years. He will look at
hospital financial status in terms of the CHIPS database
and the implications of the data for policymakers.
Stuart Guterman became a principal research
associate in the Health Policy Center of the Urban
Institute in March, after having been deputy director of
MedPAC. He joined MedPAC as a result of the amal-
gam of ProPAC and PPRC in 1997. He had been with
ProPAC since 1988, as its deputy director since 1990.
Previously, he was chief of institutional studies in the
Health Care Financing Administration’s Office of
Research. He served on the National Advisory Panel
that developed Financial Viability Measures for Hospi-
tals and Health Systems in 1998. He will explore the
policy aspects of ProPAC’s and MedPAC’s work on
hospital financial indicators, including derivation of
recommendations for the PPS update.
Terence M. Mieling, C.P.A., is director of Merrill
Lynch’s Health Care Finance Group. Located in Chi-
cago, he was also a member of the National Advisory
Panel. During his 18 years at Merrill Lynch, he has
provided investment banking services to hospital,
physician, managed care, and long-term-care clients.
Prior to that, he was a senior manager with Ernst &
Young in Chicago. Earlier, he served as the chief
financial officer of Hospital Sisters Health System in
Illinois. He will share a Wall Street view of hospital
financial indicators. In his investment perspective, he
will explore bond ratings, liquidity and cash flow, debt
burden, and other factors.
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